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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

26 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Enno H. Knoche  
Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence  
Community  
  
Mr. Richard Lehman ✓  
Director of Strategic Research  
  
SUBJECT : The National Intelligence Production Problem

Hank and Dick:


Attached is the draft of a memorandum which outlines and amplifies in writing some of the points I tried to convey orally at our 25 February session with the Director. I would welcome any comments or reactions either of you might care to offer.

I know that each of you will not agree with several of my prescriptive recommendations (though I suspect that your respective objections will not be directed at the same recommendations or based on the same arguments). I am not soliciting agreement or consensus, but would appreciate it very much if you would flag any comments which either of you see as containing factual errors.



George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

Attachment



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Paul:

The meeting last night with Bush on National production was inconclusive. I talked first, Carl endorsed my views, George made his pitch and then Knoche. Bush then asked Lehman for his views.

It was obvious that Bush felt the discussions were very educational and said he would have another meeting with us next week. Some one (probably Lehman) will write up the issues and we should be prepared to discuss them.

Trends:--It was clear that no one recommended any change in the way current intelligence production is organized.

--I am sure that NIE production will not be in the IC Staff...Bush repeated his view that the CFI should not get into production.

--Bush said that he was concerned with two "perceptions". He wants NIES to appear and be "ecumenical". He wants the production of NIES to be close to the DCI. "Nies needn't go through either Deputy."

Anyway we will have another go at it next week.

Ed

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Bill Morrel, Treasury USIB Member, called with regard to the DCI's request for comments on the organization of the community. He observed that there was a tendency for non-substantive people like those on the IC Staff to get too much control. When I asked what he meant he referred to the KIQ process and "evaluations". These he said should be handled by substantive people like those in the DDI or the NIOs.

He feels strongly that some thing like USIB should be established under the DCI to deal with the substance of national intelligence--production and consumer relations. This should ~~not be related~~ <sup>tasks</sup> separate from the budget and management of the CFI and the IC Staff.

I told Bill that he should put his thoughts on paper and send them to the DCI.

*EAP*

Two problems to be addressed re National Intelligence Estimates

- The quality of ~~the~~ national intelligence and how well it serves the needs of principal consumers.
- The organizational arrangements for producing it.

Organizational:

Question whether production of national intelligence should be under the Deputy for the community or under deputy ~~for~~ for the Agency.

- Job of resources allocation and management of Community is large and complicated--sufficiently so to take all the time and attention of the staff and deputy for the community--rename it the Deputy for Intelligence community management.

E.O. -The Director is assigned the responsibility for supervising production and dissemination of national intelligence

- CIA is responsible for the <sup>actual</sup> production and dissemination of "foreign intel related to national security...to meet the needs of the President, NSC and other elements of the USG (Sec 4 (b)).

National Intelligence (excluding Current)?

- traditionally Nat Intel are the findings and judgments of the DCI that also:
  - .includes inputs from other members of community
  - .reflects agreed judgments and consensus of Community
  - .contains dissenting views of those who do not agree.

Mechanism:

- A forum like USIB to discuss estimates ~~and~~ at the highest level of community is needed.
- Options for preparation (should be governed by E.O. and how to produce best product responsive to consumers.)

1. Present NIO system

- Purpose was group of senior experts to serve as focal point for community activities--including collection, production and customer relations.
- ~~Replace DNE which had become ineffective and~~

- Replace BNE, which had become ineffective and unresponsive to needs of consumers.
- Served personal needs of Colby

DDO: Plus:

- Helped to rationalize subject matter of NIEs, dropping many marginal ones
- Helped focus productive efforts on critical national intelligence problems.
- Improved procedures for identifying potential crisis situations.

BUT: Minuses:

- Failed to achieve full participation in the <sup>actual</sup> production of National papers.--most production sponsored by NIOs came from CIA line offices.
- Not designed to get collegial judgments--only one NIO specialist handled ~~most papers~~ his own papers.
- Reliance ~~on~~ by NIOs created bureaucratic problems ..diluted authority of DDI and office chiefs over his component--confused supervisory control & review. ..took inordinate amount of ~~time~~ CIA time to manage production of NIEs - *Quality uncertain*,
- Other Agencies still regard NIO system as CIA.

Option 3: Integrate the production of Nat Int into the production line of the CIA with a Board of National Estimates subordinate to the D for CIA. ~~Eliminate~~ with full participation of community.

- Focus responsibility clearly for production in one place...in place where most of the production capability is--CIA.
- ~~Eliminate bureaucratic rivalry~~ <sup>current state</sup>
- Integrate estimative and analytical functions
- Eliminate bureaucratic rivalry,
- Clarify confusion among customers about where to ~~go~~ go for help.
- Facilitate significant reduction in expensive resources
- Topped by small elite board, mostly of outsiders, ~~perhaps~~ perhaps outside govt. but with DIA, State and CIA members. (half dozen people or so.) with fixed term

1. Modified Present	2. Board of National Intelligence	3. D/A also D/NI
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. D/C respons for all comty matters by production</li> <li>b. NFIB advisory to DCI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. D/A Vice Chairman</li> <li>. D member</li> <li>. D/C supports NFIB &amp; comt<del>es</del></li> </ul> </li> <li>c. Continue NIOs uder DCI</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Same</li> <li>b. Same <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Same</li> <li>. Same</li> <li>. D/A has NFIB support</li> </ul> </li> <li>c. BNI under DCI <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Replaces NIOs</li> <li>. Chairdd by D/A</li> </ul> </li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. D/CM vs D/NI</li> <li>b. Same <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>. Same</li> <li>. Same</li> <li>. D/NI has NFIB support</li> </ul> </li> <li>c. NIO successor under D/NI</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+Strong emphasis on Nat Intel</li> <li>+DCI comty role clear</li> <li>+DCI close to substance</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+Maximum emphasis on Nat Int</li> <li>+D/C out of D/A business</li> <li>+DCI comty role separte from CIA business</li> <li>+DCI close access to substance</li> <li>+CIA Primary role recognized</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>+Nat Intel still primary</li> <li>+Separate &amp; balanced roles for D/CM and D/NI</li> <li>+DCI impartial on resources</li> <li>+DCI close links to CIA for substance</li> <li>+CIA primary role recognized</li> <li>+Clear chain of command for production</li> </ul>
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-NIO's rely on CIA</li> <li>-NIO's perceived as CIA</li> <li>-Entangled relationship among D/A, D/C &amp; NIO</li> <li>-Disrupts CIA chain of comand</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-D/A chair BNI gives CIA flavor</li> <li>-D/A dual role adminstratively awkward</li> <li>-Disrupts CIA chain of comand</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>-DCI further from substance</li> <li>-Not so comty oriented</li> <li>-CIA in disguise</li> <li>-D/NI less time to run CIA</li> </ul>

26 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT : The National Intelligence Production Problem

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## I. THE GAP IN THE 18 FEBRUARY EXECUTIVE ORDER.

A. Background.

The legislative foundations of the Office of the DCI and the Central Intelligence Agency were laid in Section 102 -- especially sub-section 102(d) -- of the National Security Act of 1947.\*

-- The 80th Congress turned to its discussion, debate and passage of the 1947 Act soon after completing its investigation of Pearl Harbor, and one of the driving purposes behind the intelligence portions of that Act was to minimize the risk of another devastating surprise attack.

-- Congress felt (I think correctly) that the roots of Pearl Harbor -- as an "intelligence failure" -- did not lie in deficient collection or, really, in deficient analysis. Instead, it saw them as having laid in the fact that germane information known to one concerned component of the US Government (e.g., the Navy Department) was not shared with other government components (e.g., the State or War Departments). Thus, there was no government entity -- except perhaps the President personally -- with access

\* The text of sub-section 102(d) included in its entirety as an attachment to this memorandum.



to all the relevant information and in a position to fit all available pieces of the puzzle together.

-- In no small measure, it was to solve this problem of monopolized, unshared information that Congress set up a Director of Central Intelligence and a central intelligence agency under his jurisdiction. In the litany of specific duties assigned to the CIA by the 1947 Act, the stress is on the coordination, correlation, evaluation, and dissemination of intelligence (which, in those days, was thought of much more in terms of "information" than in terms of broad analyses, assessment or estimates).

Much has been built on this foundation laid down in sub-section 102 (d) of the 1947 Act:

-- The responsibilities it assigned to "correlate and evaluate" intelligence have burgeoned into responsibilities for national intelligence production as we know it today.

-- The espionage function was given to CIA as a "service of common concern," as -- later -- were certain technical collection responsibilities.

-- The covert action function was also assigned to CIA as one of those "other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct."

-- The DCI, over time, acquired responsibilities for advising on the allocation and

management of the resources devoted to the entire Intelligence Community, though this responsibility was not formalized in writing until President Nixon's memorandum of 5 November 1971 and was never accompanied by the authorities essential to its discharge until President Ford's 18 February 1976 Executive Order.

B. The DCI's Present Responsibilities and the Executive Order's Gap.

The net result of all of the above has been that, over the course of nearly three decades, the DCI has acquired three major sets of continuing responsibilities -- clearly interrelated, but nonetheless both distinguishable and distinct:

1. Being the fount of national intelligence and, as such, the US Government's senior substantive intelligence officer and adviser;
2. Being the head of the Intelligence Community and, as such, the government's principal adviser on (and, now, controller of) the management of intelligence resources; and
3. Managing the CIA (which, in turn, has institutional responsibilities for production, overt collection, covert collection (by both human and technical sources), counterintelligence and covert action).

All of these three sets of responsibilities are important, but the first -- being the fount of national intelligence -- is the most basic. It is the one with the clearest statutory foundation.

The other two, in effect, provide the instruments which facilitate its discharge. Yet this primary set of responsibilities is not explicitly addressed in President Ford's Executive Order. The latter says much about the management of intelligence resources and the mechanisms involved therein. It also says a good deal about the management of CIA and is quite specific about things which the CIA can and cannot do. But it says fairly little about the production of national intelligence:

-- In Section 3(d)(1)(iv) the DCI is instructed to "act as the President's primary adviser on foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates; develop national intelligence requirements and priorities; and supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence."

-- In Section 4(a)(2) each "senior official" of the Intelligence Community is directed to "contribute in areas of his responsibility to the national intelligence products produced under auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence."

-- As for the CIA, there is a certain discrepancy between the actual Executive Order and the White House Fact Sheet which accompanies it. The Fact Sheet says the CIA is responsible "among other duties...for [the] production of national intelligence." The Executive Order itself, however, does not use the word "national."

C. The Challenge and the Opportunity.

In its silence on this critical matter of how national intelligence is to be produced, (a silence which I gather was intentional, to leave you maximum flexibility and discretion), the Executive Order poses a challenge and provides you a rare opportunity. The Executive Order, in effect, wipes the slate clean. In abolishing all the procedures and mechanisms developed over nearly three decades to produce national intelligence, it simultaneously abrogates all the bureaucratic compromises and eliminates all the ad hoc, often jury-rigged approaches those procedures and mechanisms reflected. It thus affords a chance to start afresh, drawing on the lessons and experience of the past but freed from its constraints and limitations. ✓

This is an opportunity not to be squandered; for its equal may not come again for decades, if ever. It is therefore advisable to get a clear, agreed understanding of the problem we are addressing before trying to assess the relative merits of alternative solutions.

## II. WHAT IS NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE?

A. Intelligence and Information.

As those who drafted and passed the 1947 Act did not clearly perceive, intelligence\* is something different from information. Information becomes intelligence through -- and only through -- the refining process of analysis. In this process, single pieces of information (e.g., individual reports) are compared with all other data known about the subject in question, evaluated with respect to their source (an evaluation which includes an assessment of that source's degree of access, repertorial accuracy, and possible bias -- or, if it is a technical source, with respect to its technical limitations), then collated with other available data in order to produce assessments and judgments, i.e., intelligence. Information, in short, is what intelligence officers (and services) collect; intelligence is what they produce.

B. The Hallmarks of National Intelligence.

National intelligence can be defined with respect to three different criteria, and to be truly national it ought to meet the tests of all three ~~tests:~~

1. It should deal with a topic of some policy consequence or importance.

\* Used throughout this memorandum in the sense of foreign intelligence (or counter-intelligence). ✓

2. It should be intelligence needed and used (or at least usable) by the President and his senior advisers on foreign affairs and the foreign aspects of national security.

3. It should reflect all the germane information on the subject in question known to all components of the US Government, should have been assessed by the best analytic talent available to the US Government, and should be presented in a form which fairly reflects (and identifies) any material differences of significant judgmental opinion among knowledgeable experts or components within the Intelligence Community.

C. The Four Types.

In practice, there are four basic types of national intelligence, defined by function and not by subject matter. They tend to blend into each other but are distinguishable, and in some contexts (including the development of optimum production arrangements) the distinctions between them become important.

1. The first is current reportage -- descriptions of and interpretative comments on what has happened, is in the process of happening, or is about to happen, in geographic areas or functional fields of policy interest.

2. The second is a fairly broad category encompassing analyses, assessments and estimates. These are attempts to explain the dynamics of evolving situations and problems,

or of changes in some foreign nations, or group's capabilities or intentions (or both), with a forward-looking appreciation of how these trends or changes are likely to evolve. Intelligence is not an exercise in prediction, but intelligence estimates -- whether they be formal NIEs published in blue covers or less formal memoranda -- should assess the various factors likely to influence the evolution of a situation, make some general judgments on what actions (or non-actions) by interested parties would affect the chances of its evolving in certain ways as opposed to other ways, and (where possible) give some general indication of the probability or likelihood of alternative lines of development.

3. The third is briefings given by the DCI as the head of the Intelligence Community, either to various Executive Branch officials or components -- e.g., the President, the National Security Council, the NSC's various subcommittees, etc. -- or to various members and committees (or subcommittees) of the Congress. The precise nature of these briefings will be shaped by the subjects they treat and the audiences to which they are to be given. They will vary widely in format and scope, some tending toward the reporting end of the spectrum, others toward broad assessments or medium- to long-range estimates.

4. Crisis Support. The fourth variety of national intelligence is more a special case than a separate type. It involves the substantive intelligence support given by the DCI -- and, through him, by the Intelligence Community -- to the President, and the others who shape our government's policies, in times of crisis or impending crisis.

D. Examples of What is Not National Intelligence

One way to clarify the concept of national intelligence, and illuminate some of the problems inherent in its production, is to consider examples of intelligence products which, while useful, are most decidedly not national.

-- One example is an assessment or estimate (small "e") of a single agency or component thereof, including the CIA -- no matter how important the topic or, for that matter, how brilliant (or even right) the assessment.

-- Another example is any single report. Individual reports can create real problems, especially in a crisis period. The more spectacular the report and/or the more sensitive its source and/or the more time-linked the significance of its contents, the greater will be the temptation for the collecting component to rush it immediately to the top levels of the government, including the President and the members of the NSC. This will be true whether the report is a particularly sensitive communications intercept, a particularly sexy photograph, or the product of a particularly sensitive human agent. Often such raw



reports are the very last thing that should be allowed to go to the President and his senior advisers unadorned, i.e., lacking the accompanying comments of analytic components of the Community with no vested bureaucratic interest in the reputation or output of the source.

### III. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE.

Prior to the issuance of the 18 February Executive Order, the structure which had evolved to handle your and the Community's national intelligence production responsibilities was -- and until you reshape it, still is -- as follows:

A. The national current intelligence function is handled by CIA, principally the Office of Current Intelligence in the Directorate of Intelligence.

OCI produced (and still produces):

1. The President's Daily Brief, which is issued in your name, which is not formally coordinated, and which goes only to the President, his Assistant for National Security Affairs, and the Vice President (not the Secretary of State -- who reads it at the White House -- the Secretary of Defense, or the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).

2. The National Intelligence Daily, which is also not fully or formally coordinated, in detail, and which goes to about seventy senior policy-level officials in (now) the Executive Branch.

3. The Intelligence Checklist, a daily publication similar to (2.) in substantive coverage -- though not format -- intended for Congress and designed, in part, to ease Congressional pressure for receipt of the Daily.

4. The National Intelligence Bulletin, a daily publication which is formally coordinated and which goes to a fairly large list of recipients both at the policy level and the

working level in the policy departments and in other components of the Intelligence Community.

5. Sundry other current publications serving more specialized audiences, such as the Economic Intelligence Weekly (which is produced by OER, not OCI).

B. National analyses, assessments and estimates -- including formal National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates -- are handled somewhat differently.

1. From the late 1940s until 1973, formal NIEs and SNIEs were produced by the Board of National Estimates and its associated staff, both collectively combined into the Office of National Estimates, which was technically part of the DCI's office but was administratively supported by CIA's Directorate of Intelligence.

2. On 1 October 1973, Bill Colby changed this arrangement, abolishing the Board and Office of National Intelligence Estimates and giving its functions to the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs). As you know, this is a group (now eleven) of senior staff officers, each responsible for a specific geographic or functional area. Estimates and other forms of national intelligence assessments are now produced under the aegis of the NIOs, who draw on the resources of the whole Community

for the drafting work involved. The NIO approach was designed, in part, to break what was perceived outside CIA as an inbred monopoly; for many outside CIA felt that under the ONE/BNE system, what purported to be National Estimates were in fact the parochial products of what was widely (though not accurately) regarded as a single subordinate office of the Central Intelligence Agency.

3. The United States Intelligence Board has played an essential role in the production of national intelligence assessments and estimates. Formal Estimates were considered and discussed by the Board, whose members -- including the heads of the three service intelligence agencies, even though they were technically only "observers" -- had the right to register dissents in them, though each formal Estimate went forward as the DCI's Estimate and no one else's. There was some pulling and hauling on this point for twenty-odd years, but President Nixon's November 1971 letter made it clear that the role of the USIB was advisory to the DCI, i.e., he was not obligated to accept the views of its members, though he was obligated to listen to them and -- in the case of formal dissents -- to reflect them.\*

4. Under the USIB came a network of inter-agency USIB committees (currently twelve formal ones and one -- SALT Monitoring -- informal).

\* Under this rather complicated arrangement, it was possible to have a CIA dissent from a DCI Estimate, and this in fact happened in at least one instance. ✓

Sometimes working with the NIOs, sometimes with elements of CIA, and sometimes on their own, some of these committees produce studies (which are "national") on a wide range of topics, many with a technical orientation. Other committees -- e.g., COMIREX -- develop priorities (on an interagency basis) for the tasking of national collection systems.

5. The present -- i.e., pre-18 February -- system for producing national intelligence has a number of flaws, many of them deriving from the fact that it is really not (and was never designed as) a system. Its bits and pieces grew up over time and some of them -- e.g., several of the USIB committees -- reflect ad hoc solutions to concrete problems and/or considerable bureaucratic compromise. The DCI and CIA were created (by statute) in 1947, the USIB evolved in the early 1950s, its various subcommittees came along later (one by one). The IC Staff was created (by Schlesinger) in February 1973. The NIOs were set up (by Colby) in October 1973. Colby intended for the IC Staff to be primarily oriented toward resource issues; the NIOs toward substantive ones; but he never sorted out nor was he ever very clear about the demarcation of their responsibilities.\* In sum, no one ever really rationalized the USIB committee structure or the respective national production roles and responsibilities of CIA's production components, the USIB, its committees, the IC

\* Since Sam Wilson and I got along with maximum mutual cooperation and minimal friction, this fuzziness was never allowed to become a major problem, though it would have been had Danny Graham remained the D/DCI/IC much longer than he did.

C. The "Extended Range" Functions of the NIOs. In considering the NIOs, it is important to remember that -- unlike the Board or Office of National Estimates -- the NIOs' responsibilities were not limited to supervising the production of national assessments (including formal Estimates), but extended over a much wider range of duties. Colby's concept was that each NIO would be accountable to him, as DCI, for the entire range of the Intelligence Community's performance on specific geographic or functional areas of major policy importance. His charge to each NIO was that the latter was to view the whole intelligence process within his (or her) area of responsibility as the DCI would view it if he had full time to devote to that area.

-- Each NIO's authority is limited, since they are staff officers to the Director and each (except NIO/SP) is supported by only one assistant and only one secretary; but nonetheless they are accountable to the DCI for the Community's performance with respect to collection and analysis as well as production, narrowly defined.

-- They are also responsible for maintaining continuing contact with policy-level consumers concerned with their respective areas

and, by maintaining this contact, for facilitating a continuing dialogue between those who produce intelligence and those who use it.

-- In setting up the NIOs (a mechanism originally conceived by Schlesinger and elaborated by Colby), your predecessor was trying, in part, to address an intractable problem which besets all organizations, especially large and complex ones: how to keep structure in line with changing functional responsibilities, i.e., how to develop a mechanism which will help enable the structure to focus its resources on actual current needs. This is difficult because needs (in this case, the major foreign policy concerns of the US Government and, hence, its principal intelligence requirements) change over time, often rapidly; but reorganizing the line structure of a large organization is difficult, inevitably disruptive, and involves enormous costs of many kinds. Colby's answer to this conundrum was the creation of a small staff element responsive to him (directly) which could easily and painlessly be altered in composition and/or mix of functional responsibilities in light of changing external requirements, which could cut laterally across the vertically structured bureaucracy, and hence could help focus the latter's efforts on current issues -- shifting the focus or resource mix as the issues shifted -- without incurring the costs and agony of line reorganization.

-- In the NIOs, Colby also wanted a mechanism that would help him discharge his substantive -- fount of national intelligence -- responsibilities as DCI. When he assumed that office, he knew he would not be the complete master of his own time (though he had little inkling of how true that hunch would prove to be). He thus wanted a mechanism -- a set of senior staff officers responsible directly to him -- which could ensure that all of his major substantive accounts received continuing, full time attention (on his behalf) from someone knowledgeable, capable and accountable (to him) and viewing these accounts from his (the DCI's) perspective -- no matter how disrupted his own hours or days proved to be. ✓

-- Colby also used the NIOs as a device for knitting together the Intelligence Community, as a community. He did this partly through having this mechanism staffless, in a way that compelled the NIOs to spread the work around, including the drafting of national intelligence products, rather than trying to do it themselves. He also did this by drawing his NIOs, and their assistants, as much as possible from throughout the Community (and from outside the Government) rather than having all of them come from one community component.

-- Being too personally involved, I am not the one to draw the net bottom line on the effectiveness, utility or contribution of the NIO system. I would suggest you tap three sources of information:



(1) Colby, who can give you a private reading on how useful (or non-useful) he found the NIO system to him as DCI.

(2) Selected senior consumers in the White House, State and Defense, who can tell you whether they think the NIOs have had any impact -- positive, negative or neutral -- on the Intelligence Community's responsiveness to their needs and the quality of its performance, including the quality and utility of its national products.

(3) Some representative cross sectional sample of professionals in the production and collection components of the Intelligence Community -- but not just in CIA. I would also respectfully suggest that this sample ought to include some working indians (who may have felt the NIOs helped them do their work more effectively) as well as component head chiefs (some of whom naturally chafed at what they inevitably perceived as the NIOs' encroachment and intrusion on their line authority).

D. DCI Briefings.

A small element assigned to the NIO structure currently produces all of the DCI's substantive briefings to various Executive Branch components -- including the NSC and its subcommittees (e.g., the WSAG) -- and the DCI's substantive briefings given personally by him to various Congressional committees.

E. Crisis Support.

The crisis support function has never been completely thought out and is a problem area that will

need to be addressed, once the main outlines of your reorganization scheme are determined. There is a CIA Watch Office, run by the DDI/OCI, which has the responsibility for supporting the DCI, but precisely how it would function in a crisis situation is somewhat obscure. Even more obscure is how the DCI would relate to the extended National Command Center being developed in the Pentagon as a fount of support to national decision making in times of actual or impending military crisis.

## IV. NEEDED DECISIONS.

Since the 18 February Executive Order has, in effect, wiped out all of the existing mechanisms through which national intelligence is produced, there are obviously many decisions which have to be made. These include what to do with the United States Intelligence Board and its various committees, how best to produce formal National Intelligence Estimates, what devices to use to ensure close dialogue between producers and consumers, how to monitor and maintain quality control over the national intelligence product, etc., etc.

Basically, however, there are five key decisions -- of which the first three are the most important -- which need to be initially addressed. Their determination will drive all the others, for the ways in which they are decided will set the matrix and framework within which these other decisions will then have to be made.

(1) The first is where to place the responsibility for producing national current intelligence and what basic mechanism to use for its production.

(2) The second is where to place responsibility for national analyses, assessments and estimates, and what basic mechanism to use to produce them.

(3) The third -- an outgrowth of the second -- is whether to preserve the "extended range" functions of the present NIOs, whether or not you keep the NIO structure and whether

or not you keep those "extended range" functions joined to the process by which national (non-current) intelligence is produced.

(4) The fourth is where to place the responsibility for preparing the substantive briefings you give as DCI, both to senior Executive Branch components and to the Congress.

(5) The fifth is where to place the responsibility for supporting you and, hence, enabling you to provide intelligence support to the process of national decision making in time of actual or impending crisis.

V. GERMANE CONSIDERATIONS.

Because the problems and processes involved in these issues are complex, the decisions with respect to them are not simple. None of the key questions have easy answers, or perfect answers, or any answers likely to be universally endorsed.

Though the organizational questions involved are extremely important, however, and decisions made with respect to them over the next few weeks will probably have effects (including some unintended ones) lasting for many years, a sense of perspective needs to be maintained. Organizational structure is not an end in itself. A good, sensible structure can make it somewhat easier for good people to do good work. But in the final analysis, people count for more than structure. Talented people can get the job done despite organizational flaws, and the best organizational structure in the world can be frustrated by people of mediocre ability.

In determining what you want in the way of an organizational structure to produce national intelligence, you should work toward developing a system and mechanism which in your opinion is most likely to meet the following requirements:

(1) What system is most likely to produce the best intelligence product?

(2) What system is most likely to be optimally responsive to the intelligence needs of those who make policy decisions at the national level?

-- Since these needs will change over time, it is essential that the intelligence system developed to meet them have a considerable degree of flexibility and adaptability. .

-- Since consumers are never going to be as precise as those who support them might desire in articulating their needs, the system adopted must provide for a maximum degree of interchange and communication between those who use intelligence and those who produce it.

(3) What system is most likely to keep basic priorities in proper order?

-- Given the American penchant and preference for the concrete and quantitatively measurable, as opposed to the abstract and qualitative, there is a continuing danger of inadvertently devising a system in which subordinate considerations will drive primary ones. Specifically, you should try to establish a system in which substantive needs and requirements will drive resource judgments, not vice versa.

(4) What arrangement will be most efficient, all factors considered? The range of factors involved in any such determination of net efficiency, is quite extensive:

-- The system must be comprehensive, yet not too cumbersome. It must be able to respond quickly, especially to new requirements, and be easily adaptable to the changing needs of a changing world.

-- You as DCI have the right to fashion any system you consider preferable, but its efficiency will be adversely affected if its structure generates more than an unavoidable element of friction or resentment-based resistance throughout the Intelligence Community.

- The rest of that Community, for example, is readily willing to accept the DCI's personal primacy in the national intelligence field, but not the institutional primacy of CIA.

- CIA, conversely, has been much battered over the past three years, hence the nerves and sensibilities of many of its career officers are understandably tender. It does have a special (even if not necessarily paramount) role in the Intelligence Community and this special role deserves to be recognized.

-- In certain contexts, simple physical factors can become quite influential. The CIA is your household cavalry and does constitute the core of the national analytic base. The resource management functions of the present IC Staff can perhaps be just as well performed downtown as at Langley, but the supervision of national intelligence production will become enormously complicated if those responsible to you for it are physically separated from CIA (and have to schedule meetings with CIA research and production managers which involve a drive to some other location rather than a short walk up or down a staircase or a hall).

(5) Another important factor which has to be taken into account is your own personal work style. The national intelligence production system has to be one with which you are comfortable and which goes with the grain, not only of your conception of the DCI's role but the way you want to handle that role's various components. Aspects of the DCI's

responsibilities to which you plan to give a great degree of personal attention can be handled by relatively small staff elements carrying out your wishes under your personal supervision. Those aspects of your responsibilities which you do not want to be continuing drains on your time, however, should be assigned to persons who will give them continuing attention under your direction and on your behalf.

-- A specific, illustrative case in point is the drafts of national intelligence products, including formal Estimates. Your two immediate predecessors personally spent an inordinate amount of time going over these documents line by line -- sometimes word by word -- with an almost editorial eye. You may not choose or feel able to spend that amount of time this way. Since, however, such national products -- particularly formal Estimates -- are issued in your name and over your signature, you are responsible for them, including their language, to the President and the Congress. Hence, if you do not want to take the time on a continuing basis to give them a final editorial look, you will need some person or institution to perform that service on your behalf.



## VI. THE NATIONAL CURRENT INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION PROCESS.

Given the nature and inevitable complexity of the process for producing national current intelligence, including the enormous amount of physical and personal overhead involved, there are only two practically viable options with respect to this function:

- (1) It can be left where it is in CIA or
- (2) it can be institutionally -- if not physically -- moved out of the CIA to the DCI's office.

Pulling the current intelligence production function out of CIA would entail detaching (at a minimum) OCI, plus supporting analytic elements in all of the other components of the Directorate of Intelligence, plus some production elements of the Directorate of Science and Technology. The net result would be to leave the CIA more or less dismembered and the institutional trauma would be enormous.

Given the above, any theoretical arguments for moving this function even institutionally (let alone physically) strike me as foundering on the rock of practicality. It, thus, seems more sensible to cope with the anomaly of a national function performed by one Community component than to translate that function into a truly national entity.

VII. THE PRODUCTION OF NATIONAL ANALYSES, ASSESSMENTS  
AND ESTIMATES (OF ALL TYPES).

Given the language and basic structure of the 18  
February Executive Order, you have five basic options  
for assigning this function.

(1) The D/DCI/IC Option.

The first is to put this function under  
the Deputy to the Director of Central Intel-  
ligence for the Intelligence Community, estab-  
lished by Section 3(d) (2) of the 18 February  
Executive Order.

-- This option has certain features  
which commend it on initial inspection.  
It would solve the problem neatly within  
the framework established by the Executive  
Order and would place what is clearly a  
"Community" function under your Community  
Deputy.

-- There are, however, objections to  
this approach which are less obvious than  
its advantages but are more fundamental.

-- It is of paramount importance that  
national analyses, assessments and estimates  
(both formal capital "E" and informal small  
"e") be as balanced, objective and free from  
institutional bias or preconception as pos-  
sible. It is almost equally important that  
they be perceived -- by the President and  
all his senior advisers, by the Congress and  
even by the public -- as balanced, objective  
and free from bias. If your Community Deputy

is a senior military officer (whether on active duty or retired), the symbolic impression will be conveyed -- no matter how unfairly -- that the dominance over the national assessment function has been given to the military. This will create severe problems for you, and for the President in many quarters, including Congress. ✓

-- The language of the Executive Order clearly gives the Community Deputy a wide range of resource management responsibilities to discharge under your supervision and on your behalf. If he is also assigned these substantive responsibilities for supervising national intelligence production, there will be a great risk -- I would argue, likelihood -- that the resource side of his account will prove to be his predominant focus, i.e., that resource considerations will be given de facto primacy over substantive ones and will come to drive substantive issues -- not vice versa, as should be the case.

-- In practical terms, the Community Deputy would almost have to appoint a subordinate to handle the substantive side of his (your) responsibilities. This would put your most basic set of responsibilities, the one with the strongest statutory foundation, at least two removes from your direct personal control.

-- We have enough trouble coordinating controversial substantive assessments and estimates when the officers presiding over the coordination (the NIOs under present arrangements) are part of the DCI's own office and his direct subordinates, speaking in his name. These difficulties would be greatly enhanced if the entity responsible for such coordination were reduced in status by being subordinated to one of your deputies, not to you yourself.

-- In sum, no matter how tidy the arrangement might seem on paper, if the responsibility for supervising the production of national analyses, assessments and estimates were subordinated to your Community Deputy, this arrangement would be likely to prejudice the Community's qualitative performance on your most important account and to generate far more problems than it solves.

(2) The D/DCI/CIA Option.

The second option is put this responsibility under your Deputy identified in the Executive Order's Section 3(d)(3) as being charged with the day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency.

-- This approach shares the advantages of the first in that it would fit neatly within the framework of the Executive Order. It would also keep this national production responsibility under the independent entity established by the National Security Act of

1947 to "correlate and evaluate" intelligence free from departmental control.

-- It would reduce the risk (inherent in Option 1) of substantive considerations being submerged in or driven by resource concerns.

-- While solving some of the problems created by the first option, however, the second would generate others, almost equally serious. It would produce a great deal of friction within the Community and be strongly resisted by many elements of the Department of Defense, and probably of the Departments of State and Treasury as well. Once again, the difficulty is that outside the building, the DCI's paramount role and primacy in the production of national intelligence are universally accepted, but CIA's institutional claims in this field are not. This approach, hence, would be seen as putting all national intelligence production under "the CIA", a move that would be certain to prompt a long spate of counterproductive bureaucratic guerrilla warfare. Other community elements would be skeptical of the D/DCI/CIA's impartiality in adjudicating their substantive objections to "national" intelligence drafted by the CIA and, as was often the case in the days of ONE/BNE, what are titled "National Intelligence Estimates" would be widely regarded as "CIA

Estimates." Such an arrangement would do little for harmony and cooperation within the Intelligence Community.

-- Furthermore, under this approach your primary set of responsibilities would still be two steps removed from your personal supervision and control, and those attempting to discharge these responsibilities on your behalf would be seen as speaking in the name of one of your subordinates, not of your own.

(3) The DDI Option.

If this function should be assigned to your deputy charged with day-to-day management of CIA he -- in turn -- will have to place it somewhere, since supervising this function is a time-consuming activity. Thus, a theoretical argument could be made for assigning this function directly to CIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence.

-- This approach too would fit fairly neatly within existing bureaucratic arrangements and would in no way (either apparently or actually) contradict the provisions of the Executive Order. Furthermore, it would have the net effect of grouping both major national intelligence production responsibilities -- the current and what might be called the "non-current" -- under the same head, for the DDI is already primarily responsible for the national current intelligence account.

-- In practice, however, this approach would generate all the problems created by giving this national analysis, assessment and estimative function to your CIA Deputy and further complicate several of them. It would generate even greater friction within the Community than the simple assignment of these responsibilities to the CIA (which would generate enough on its own) and would place this -- your primary account -- even further removed from your direct supervision. Also this approach would considerably complicate the relationship between your "CIA Deputy" and his (nominally subordinate) DDI, since the latter would have charge over a major part of your own personal responsibilities. The "DDI Option", consequently, would be almost guaranteed to create far more problems than it solved.

(4) The "DCI Staff Element" Option.

A fourth option would be to set up some staff element which would be institutionally a part of the DCI's office, but not part of the CIA and also not formally subordinated to the Community Deputy. Such an approach could have any of several variants.

-- One illustrative example would be a reincarnation of the Board of National Estimates, with a Chairman reporting directly to you. Another would be to keep some modified version of the NIO structure..

-- This approach would not fit as neatly within the schema sketched in the Executive Order as the three preceding options, but there is nothing in the Order which specifically precludes it and it would be argued as being legitimized by paragraph xiv of that Order's Section 3(d)(1), which authorizes the DCI to "establish such committees...to assist in his conduct of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate."

-- The practical feasibility of this option hinges in some measure on whether or not you want to preserve the extended range responsibilities of the present NIOs. A body such as is envisaged under this option could be structured to work with reasonable efficiency if its responsibilities were fairly narrowly drawn and largely confined to the production of formal National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates. It would have difficulty performing a perceptibly broader range of responsibilities.

(5) The "Third Deputy" Option.

Your fifth option -- which follows the same general line of approach as the fourth but differs in a matter of degree -- would be to more or less keep the essence of pre-18 February arrangements by having you designate a senior officer, reporting only to you, who would be identified as the custodian (on your behalf) of your



responsibilities for the production of national analyses, assessments and estimates. The functions of this officer and the degree of backing you gave him would be more important than his precise title, but in net effect he would become your "Deputy for National Intelligence", supervising the discharge of one of your three sets of basic responsibilities outlined in Section I-B above in a manner analogous to that in which the two deputies specifically commissioned in the Executive Order respectively supervise the other two.

-- In abstract organizational theory, this would be a fairly clean arrangement. At least in appearance, however, it would seem to run somewhat against the grain of the Executive Order and following it on your own recognizance might be construed as a considerable stretching of the bounds of organizational discretionary latitude which that Executive Order gives you in the production sphere.

-- The attractiveness of this option, and particularly the extent to which it is preferable to the fourth (if you choose this basic line of approach) again hinges on whether or not you want to preserve the extended range functions of the present NIOs. If you do, then this option provides probably the easiest framework within which to structure a mechanism capable of performing them.

-- Both options four and five would have the advantage of keeping the responsibility for the production of national analyses, assessments and estimates directly under your control, free from any apparent taint of possible military dominance, not submerged into resource considerations, yet simultaneously not vested in any single component of the Intelligence Community.

VIII. THE DCI BRIEFING FUNCTION.

The decision on where to assign the responsibility for preparing your substantive briefings to both senior Executive Branch components (including the President and the NSC) and to Congress should be driven by your decision on where you want to place the responsibility for producing national analyses, assessments and estimates. The two functions are complementary and closely interrelated, and the briefing function can be much better performed if both are under the same bureaucratic roof -- no matter what that roof may be.

## IX. THE CRISIS MANAGEMENT SUPPORT FUNCTION.

This is a thicket of thorny problems which have never been adequately diagnosed, squarely faced or properly resolved. In some ways they could not have been resolved prior to 18 February 1976, given the ambiguous nature of the DCI's relationship to the Secretary of Defense and the DCI's ambiguous degree of control over Defense Department collection resources, which existed from 1947 until the Executive Order was issued. Those portions of the Executive Order which set up the Committee on Foreign Intelligence and made you (the DCI) its Chairman could go a long way toward resolving these ambiguities and might make it possible to develop a structure which actually could serve this country in time of real crisis. The issues involved here, however, are sufficiently complicated, the parochial or institutional equities they touch sufficiently numerous, and the bureaucratic passions they engender sufficiently strong that I would suggest deferring a specific address to this set of problems until you have the broad outlines of the rest of your production structure jelled and clarified.

## X. OTHER DECISIONS. /

After you have made the basic decisions outlined above, which determine where you want to place the national intelligence production responsibilities and the basic mechanism you want to use to facilitate their discharge, there are clearly many other decisions that have to be made; but these cannot efficiently be addressed until the more fundamental questions have been answered. Examples of these important, but ancillary decisions, are:

-- What should be done with the United States Intelligence Board or, more precisely, what mechanism(s) should be set up to discharge the essential functions it performs.

- Should it be converted into a national intelligence production board?

- Should the membership of any such board remain that of the present United States Intelligence Board or should this board have a different membership?

- What should be done about the heads of the three service intelligence agencies? Should they be kept on any such production board as active participants with a right of dissent, or should they be relegated to the back benches?

- Should there be one production board or perhaps two? One to deal with political and military subjects; another with economic ones?

-- What should be done with the USIB Committees?

- Should their number be reduced and their somewhat overlapping functions streamlined (e.g., do you really still need a CCPC)?

- Should they be placed under the basic body or bodies created to perform the present USIB's functions, or should some of them be fitted elsewhere into the overall design?

- Should the whole committee structure be radically reorganized? For example, instead of organization by collection technique (e.g., COMIREX, the SIGINT Committee, and the Human Sources Committee), should new committees be set up on a functional or geographic area principle -- i.e., should there be a committee on Soviet Affairs, China, Strategic Programs, etc., each of which cuts across all of the collection disciplines?

-- What changes, if any, should be made in the way National Estimates are prepared, coordinated, reviewed or submitted?

- Should the mechanism assigned supervisory responsibility for the preparation of national estimates have a separate drafting staff or should the drafting still be done by individuals throughout the Community -- seconded for this purpose?

- What provisions, if any, should be made to give estimates -- now prepared under the supervision of broad-gauged specialists -- more of a generalist review prior to their being submitted to the President and other top-level consumers in your name?

-- What process should be used to ensure that the efforts of the Community are indeed focused on

the issue of major policy concern, and what procedure should be used to assess the adequacy of the Community's qualitative performance?

- Do you want to stay with the Key Intelligence Question approach and its associated evaluation program or should both be scrapped or materially modified?

XI. PROCEDURAL RECOMMENDATIONS. )

In light of the factors and considerations outlined above, I would offer the following recommendations on the sequential steps that should be taken to address the problem of how to handle national intelligence production:

(1) Defer all other decisions until you have have decided:

(a) Where to assign the basic responsibilities that collectively define this function, and

(b) Whether or not you feel a need for senior subordinates performing the extended range functions now performed by the NIOs, and, if so,

(c) Whether or not you want to keep these extended range functions joined to the responsibility for supervising national production.

(2) Once these basic decisions are made, commission a detailed study of how the rest of the questions germane to the production of national intelligence can best be answered:

(a) This study should identify all of these questions.

(b) It should rank them in the order in which they can most logically be answered (since the answers to some will depend on the answers given to others).

(c) It should offer alternative options (stating the pros and cons of each) for your consideration and choice.

(d) It should be prepared by a small group which, collectively, reflects a cross-section of the Community's knowledge of, and equities in, the many complex details involved.



XII. PERSONAL VIEWS

I strongly recommend that you follow the above procedural suggestions in the process of making your decisions, whatever those decisions may ultimately be.

Quite separate from them, I thought I would outline my own personal recommendations for whatever value you may find them. I have devoted a great deal of time over the past several months <sup>to</sup> wrestling with these issues, and the questions they raise relate to activities for which I have been professionally responsible since 1 October 1973.

In the interest of responsiveness to our government's and country's needs, producing the highest quality product attainable, and overall efficiency with respect to the taxpayers' resources, I strongly believe that:

- (1) The national current intelligence function should be kept in CIA.
- (2) The national analysis, assessment and estimative function should be placed directly under the DCI, not under the Community Deputy or the CIA Deputy or any of their subordinates.
- (3) Those who supervise this function on your behalf should, however, remain physically housed in CIA in close proximity to the national analytical base and the national current intelligence effort.
- (4) If I correctly understand the way you want and plan to apportion your time -- i.e., devote a great deal of it to Congressional matters, CFI matters, direct dialogue with the President and members of the NSC, and enhancing the Intelligence Community's public image -- you will find some preservation of the extended range functions of the present National Intelligence Officers extremely valuable

if not indispensable. If you do not have some such group or mechanism responsible only to you giving continuing attention to your major substantive concerns:

-- The drain these substantive responsibilities will put on your own time will be inordinate.

-- You will not have clear accountability to you for the quality of national intelligence production and of the Community's overall substantive performance.

-- You will run the risk of having your position with the President and with Congress hostage to the judgments of others who have institutional perspectives different from your own.

George A. Carver, Jr.  
Deputy for National Intelligence Officers

25 February 1976

Options for a National Center of Coordinated Intelligence

There are four options for processing national coordinated intelligence to support the DCI. In this memorandum this includes current intelligence, indications and warning or crisis intelligence, and national estimates:

- Option One would be for this to be structured within CIA as the central focus of national intelligence production.
- Option Two would be to structure it under the IC Staff.
- Option Three would create a mechanism for national intelligence at the DCI level.
- Option Four, outlined below, would create a Center for Coordinated Intelligence structured between the Deputy Director for CIA and the Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community.

The Center for National Coordinated Intelligence would have four major responsibilities: an operations center, the production of current intelligence, the production of alert memoranda and crisis intelligence, and the production of national estimates. The Center would be jointly staffed but would be situated within Headquarters Building and directed by a CIA officer. It would rely heavily upon the production elements of

CIA in the drafting of items of national production. All formal memoranda of the National Center would be produced as interagency product.

There are three possible lines of authority under which the Center for National Coordinated Intelligence could fall: (1) under the Deputy Director/IC, (2) under the Deputy Director/CIA, or (3) jointly in some fashion under the IC and CIA. Under present planning there would be an Associate Director on the IC Staff responsible for those Community concerns relating to national production. He could or could not be responsible for interagency production but he would be responsible for overseeing national intelligence needs from the Community point of view. Under alternative 3 above (a derivative of alternative 2) the same person would serve as the Director of the Center for National Intelligence under the DD/CIA and as the Associate Director for National Production under the DD/IC. That person therefore would report to the DCI through both the Deputy Director for CIA and the Deputy Director for the Community.


This memorandum recommends the adoption of alternative 3.

The arguments for this option are:

- This option formalizes existing practice.
- It creates a compromise solution on the issue of those aspects of national intelligence that have long been the thorn in CIA's side; namely, national estimates and current intelligence.
- It subordinates national intelligence sufficiently within the CIA structure to allow more control of tasking than was possible under the NIO system.
- It puts together a production element that can speak for the Community on the major policy-oriented items of DCI concern.
- Cosmetically, by being jointly under the Deputy Director for CIA and the Deputy Director for the Community it rightly appears as a National Center which the DCI represents.
- The Center would allow for a centralized procedure for national intelligence production without duplicating on the Community Staff many of the supporting elements of expertise that would be necessary were the function removed from CIA.

The arguments against this option are:

- The association with CIA in any way can be taken by Agency antagonists as just another ruse to control current intelligence and national estimates.
- Making a Director of the National Center responsible to two deputy directors is not neat administratively.
- Any subordinate of the national intelligence product under the Deputy Director for the Community is not consistent with that view of the division of responsibilities under the DCI that says substance goes to DD/CIA and resources and management goes to DD/IC.



<b>TRANSMITTAL SLIP</b>		DATE	25 Feb 76
TO: Mr. Richard Lehman			
ROOM NO.	BUILDING		
REMARKS:			
<p>Attached, for information, are pro and con points re a National Center for Coordinated Intelligence and associated wire diagrams.</p> <p>Knoche has a copy.</p>			
FROM:		A/C/PRD/IC	
ROOM NO.	BUILDING	EXTENSION	
6E04	Hqs.		
FORM NO. 241		(47)	
1 FEB 55		REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.	

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